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Abstract: The willingness to trust human receivers is compared to 
the inclination to take lottery risk in six distinct scenarios, controlling 
the return distributions. Trust shows significantly smaller 
responsiveness to return expectations compared to parallel pure-
risk lottery allocation, and paired comparisons reveal that investors 
sacrifice 5% of the expected payoff to trust anonymous receivers. 
Trust is more calculated and volatile for males, while appearing 
relative stable for females. The results complement the 
accumulating evidence regarding physiological differences between 
trust and risk, in addition suggesting that the trust-risk gap is larger 
for females.  
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1. Introduction  
Common definitions of trust speak of accepting temporary vulnerability based 
upon positive expectations of others (Rousseau et al., 1998). Subjective 
return expectations and personal risk appetites accordingly play major roles in 
individual trust decisions (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2001; Eckel and Wilson, 
2004). If two potential trustors similarly believe that the trustee is as likely to 
double their investment or choose zero return, then the more risk-averse 
would emerge as less trusting (Schechter, 2007). Vice versa, it is reasonable 
to assume that agents with more optimistic expectations would exhibit larger 
trust, beyond the effect of personal risk preference and unobservable 
covariates (Fehr, 2009). Experimental and survey studies indeed illustrate that 
trust strongly correlates with expected returns, but the findings for exogenous 
risk preference measures are generally mixed and inconsistent (compare 
Lönnqvist et al., 2015 and Butler et al., 2016 results for the Holt and Laury, 
2002 measure).   
 
The current paper adopts an integrative approach to explore the threefold 
interaction between trust, trustworthiness expectations, and individual risk 
preference. We run a multi-task survey experiment where subjects submit 
their trust decisions in a sequence of six distinct trust scenarios, simplifying 
the Berg et al. (1995) familiar investment game. The possible return levels are 
denominated in proportional terms, so that trustees commit to some fixed ratio 
of return without being able to condition on the selected investment. The 
menu of possible return levels is changed between games to examine the 
response to institutional change and characterize individual trust across 
distinct environments. A separate section of the questionnaire, elicits subjects' 
beliefs regarding the trustworthiness of randomly chosen trustees in each of 
the relevant trust environments. The elicited beliefs are finally used to define 
pure-chance lotteries with return distributions that copy the subjective 
assessments that subjects delivered for the trust games. The triadic design 
therefore consists of 3 components: trust games, belief elicitations, and pure-
risk decisions, where each component sequentially refers to several distinct 
scenarios, based on trust games with distinct proportional return possibilities. 
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As we cannot actually play that many games in the lab, we use an 
incentivized survey, where MBA students (N=110; 48 females; mean age 33) 
take the experiment for grade bonus knowing that one of the tasks would be 
selected to determine their participation fee.  
    
Since the six conditions triadic design is rather rich, we cannot list the many 
hypotheses that can be examined with such data. When designing the survey, 
for instance, we confidently hypothesized that the pure-risk decisions would 
strongly respond to expected returns, but were curious to learn if trust 
decisions show similar sensitivity to subjective expectations. The elicitation of 
six trust decisions and six parallel pure-risk choices per subject has the 
additional virtue that endogenous confounds, such as hidden norms or 
personal traits that mutually affect trustworthiness expectations and trust, are 
controlled at the individual level. With six conditions per subject, the relative 
responsiveness of trust and risk to expected return may be compared, across 
the sample, for each of the six scenarios first, and then additionally compared 
at the individual level to verify that the cross-section results sustain when 
hidden covariates are controlled.1 The results indeed prove that trust shows 
much smaller responsiveness to expected returns compared to the parallel 
pure-risk decision, in each of the six conditions and at the individual level. The 
relative rigidity of trust is costly. Paired comparisons show that subjects 
sacrifice about 5% of the expected payoff to trust anonymous receivers.  
 
We also point at some intriguing gender differences and discuss few 
discrepancies between the paired trust and risk decisions and findings of the 
decision under ambiguity literature. With this respect, the paper joins the 
emerging trust-as-trait research, pointing at distinctive properties of the 
inclination to trust compared to parallel risk-taking (see the neuroimaging 
studies of McCabe et al., 2001; Kosfeld et al., 2005; Krueger et al., 2012). 
                                                           
1
 If trustor A, for example, is a pessimist with negative return expectations that always invests 
about 20% of the budget and B is an optimist with positive expectations that always invests 
about 80% of the budget then trust positively correlates with expected returns across the 
sample, but the correlation follows from optimism and does not show at the individual level.  
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Moreover, the trust vs. risk difference is more pronounced for females 
compared to males. 
 
The paper proceeds with brief literature review (Section 2), closer discussion 
of the design (Section 3) and comments on the statistical method (Section 4). 
Section 5 presents the main results, while sections 6-8 more closely discuss 
the results in light of relevant background literatures. Section 9 concludes.   
 
2. Literature review 
In Berg et al. (1995) two-stage trust game, the trustor first selects an 
investment X which triples to 3X at the hands of the trustee. The trustee then 
decides on the return Y (0≤Y≤3X) that would be paid back to the trustor for 
making the investment. If both players are endowed with 100, the final 
balance of the investor is 100-X+Y, while the receiver ends with 100+3X-Y. 
Part of the vast interest in the game follows from the large distance between 
the grim equilibrium solution and typical experimental results. In equilibrium, 
the self-regarding trustee always keeps the tripled transfer, so the rational 
trustor does not invest. Johnson and Mislin (2011) meta-analysis of more than 
150 experiments contrarily reveals mean investment of about 50% of the 
endowment, with payback ratio close to 37% of the amount received. 
 
The anticipated correlation between trustworthiness expectations and levels 
of trust has repeatedly surfaced in diverse cross-sample studies. Positive 
correlations emerged in multicultural studies (Ashraf et al., 2006), in repeated 
test-retest examinations (Lönnqvist et al., 2015), and in experiments where 
quadratic scoring rules were used to incentivize belief elicitation (Butler et al., 
2016). In few papers, belief elicitation was conditional, so that subjects 
reported their expected return for each possible transfer (Sapienza et al., 
2013), but we are not aware of studies that elicit the likelihood of each 
possible return, similarly to the approach of the current experiment. Fehr 
(2009) discusses the empirical problems that arise due to the endogeneity of 
trustworthiness expectations, illustrating that the correlation between 
expectations and trust may be an artifact of hidden covariates. Costa-Gomez 
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et al. (2014) apply an instrumental variable approach, randomly perturbing the 
returns to prove the causal relation between expected trustworthiness and 
trust. A more direct approach is taken by Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012) 
that provide subjects with exogenous information regarding the distribution of 
returns. One group played a binary trust game with relatively generous 
trustees, while the other played the game with more egocentric responders. 
The trust levels of the subjects with good return prospects significantly 
exceeded the trust of subjects with poor return chances. The difference was 
even larger when the second player was eliminated and the tasks were 
framed as pure-risk decision problems. Overall, however, the trust-game 
literature uniformly confirms that expectations play significant role in individual 
trust decisions. Optimistic proposers transfer larger amounts to the receivers.  
 
The experimental findings regarding the link between individual risk appetite 
and inclination to trust, on the contrary, are generally mixed and frequently fail 
to produce the anticipated correlation. The Holt and Laury (2002) 10 levels 
risk aversion scale (henceforth: the HL measure) was tested in several 
studies that also controlled for subjective return expectations. The results 
were negative, finding no significant correlation between HL risk aversion and 
trust decisions in Eckel and Wilson (2004), Houser et al. (2010) and Lönnqvist 
et al (2015); but turned positive for the larger sample of Butler et al. (2016). 
Significant correlations between risk preference and trust also emerged when 
the pure-risk assignment was structured similarly to the trust game 
(Schechter, 2007), when a finer 15 points scale was used to characterize 
personal risk attitude (Sapienza et al., 2013), and when subjects ranked their 
general inclination to take risk in 0-10 ordinal scale (Lönnqvist et al., 2015, 
utilizing the Dohmen et al. 2011 stated risk preference measure). We avoid 
verbal risk preference statements in the current study, suspecting that these 
may affect (or be affected by) choices in other parts of the questionnaire. 
Alternatively, we utilize the lottery choice task of Weinstock and Sonsino 
(2014) that proved successful in terms of showing strong predictive power for 
forecast-optimism. The task is presented in Section 6.  
 
5 
 
Finally note that while the literature generally agrees that females are more 
risk averse than males (e.g., Borghans et al., 2009), the evidence regarding 
gender, trust, and trustworthiness is mixed. Several papers propose that 
males invest more than females but females are more trustworthy (Croson 
and Gneezy, 2009), but one or both of these findings are contradicted in other 
studies (Chaudhuri and Sbai, 2011; Dittrich, 2015).  
 
3. The questionnaire design 
3.1: General method  
The questionnaire was distributed in MBA classes between May 2014 and 
March 2015. We took the entire 90 minutes session, so participation time was 
not effectively constrained. The booklet was divided into short chapters, with 
task-specific instructions preceding each section (Web supplement A). The 
procedure of the experiment and specific tasks were presented by the 
blackboard first, directing students to refrain from public comments. All tasks 
were denominated in hypothetical currency and one task was randomly 
selected to derive the participation bonus. The conversion ratio of currency 
units to participation fees was not announced in advance, but participants 
were told that the expected bonus is around 80-100 NIS, with individual 
payments ranging between 20 and 200 depending on choices and luck.2 The 
payments derivation date was announced in advance and the participants 
were invited to supervise the process. The questionnaire did not ask for 
names or addresses. The results were announced by email, and id numbers 
were used for the bonus distribution. We have used two versions of the 
questionnaire, counterbalancing the order of tasks within chapters, but 
keeping the chapters’ order fixed. The main chapters are described next.  
3.2: Trust games with binary return possibilities  
We use a simultaneous version of Berg et al. (1995) investment game where 
the trustor selects an investment 0≤X≤100K and the trustee concurrently 
chooses between low and high proportional returns (see Figure 1 for an 
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 The US$ was traded at 3.5 NIS around the experiment; the Euro rate was 4.7-4.8 NIS.  
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example).3 Both players are initially endowed with 100K and the investment X 
is tripled at the transfer. The return on investment is negative when the trustee 
selects the low return level (henceforth: LRL), but turns positive when the high 
return level (HRL) is chosen. The instructions adopted a neutral frame, using 
A and B to address the two players, and telling subjects that they would be 
randomly matched with students from a distinct class of undergrad or grad 
students, majoring in business or other topic, from the same college or a 
different academic institute. The matching with anonymous partners from a 
loosely identified pool increases the social distance between players 
(Charness et al., 2007) compared to within-session or same-campus 
matching. Intuitively, we suspect that risk-taking considerations play stronger 
role in trust decisions when social distance is large. We therefore test if trust 
systematically differs from equivalent risk-taking in settings where the two 
decisions have relatively strong chances to coincide. 
In particular, chapter 1 of the questionnaire consisted of 5 binary-return trust 
games: the 4 games that emerge when LRL   {0.15, 0.9} and HRL   {1.35, 
1.8}, and a filler game with LRL=0.75 and HRL=1.2 (the filler is discussed 
later). Each of the 5 games was presented in a separate page and page-
turning or note-taking were forbidden. The upper snapshot of Figure 1 
presents the (translated) 0.9-1.8 condition. The possible return levels are 
denominated in terms of the tripled amount (3X) and the transfer (X) in 
parallel; e.g., LRL=0.9 is described as "return of 30% (of 3X) = 0.9X". The 
participants first select an investment level, assuming they are assigned to 
player A's role, and then choose a return level assuming they play the role of 
player B. The instructions emphasized that since the payment task is 
randomly drawn, only one of the decisions may actually determine their 
bonus. To verify comprehension, subjects were asked to calculate the final 
balance of the two players in some hypothetical scenario and the 
experimenter assisted the few students with difficulties.   
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 Simultaneous trust games were used at Servátka at al. (2008) and Costa-Gomes et al. 
(2014). Triadic designs were also utilized to disentangle trust and reciprocity (Cox, 2004). 
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3.3: Belief elicitation  
As part of the triadic examination, we elicit subjects' beliefs regarding the 
likelihoods of low and high returns. Beliefs were elicited in a later chapter of 
the questionnaire, with at least one intervening chapter. The tasks were 
separated to avoid the possible impact of concurrent or preceding elicitation 
on trust decisions (cf. Schotter and Trevino, 2014). Again, subjects were 
faced with the four games that emerge when LRL   {0.15, 0.9} and HRL   
{1.35, 1.8}, as well as a filler game with LRL=0.15 and HRL=1.05. The second 
snapshot of Figure 1 presents the 0.9-1.8 assignment. The participants fill-in 
the likelihood that they assign to each return level and then copy one of the 
assessments, marked by the letter Q, to a supplementary page that was 
distributed with the main questionnaire. The extra page included a table with 5 
capital letters in one column and an empty second column where subjects 
copied their probability assessments.4 The table was utilized later to construct 
the lotteries that match the trust games. The filler problems were included to 
mask the link between the trust games and the parallel lottery allocation tasks. 
The filler return levels were modified between chapters to enhance the 
masking. A standard quadratic scoring rule was used to incentivize the belief 
elicitations.  
3.4: Lottery allocations  
A snapshot of the 0.9-1.8 lottery allocation task is provided at the bottom of 
Figure 1. Subjects are requested to copy the value of Q from their 
supplementary page and choose an investment level 0≤X≤100K assuming the 
investment may bring 0.9 or 1.8 return with probabilities Q and 100-Q. While 
the procedure of connecting the trust game beliefs to the lottery allocation 
tasks could be run more efficiently in a computerized experiment, we chose to 
run in-class sessions in order to approach MBA students that would not show 
to discretionary laboratory sessions. The lottery allocation tasks were 
presents in a distinct chapter, and the filler parameters were altered again 
(LRL=0.45; HRL=1.5). In addition, this chapter included 2 lottery allocation 
tasks that were presented before the respective trust games. The flow of 
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 The copied probabilities referred to LRL and HRL interchangeably.    
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tasks in the binary games and the reversed-order games is contrasted in 
Figure 2. The reversed-order conditions are discussed next.  
3.5: Games with exogenous return distributions  
To be able to present lottery allocation tasks before the respective trust 
games we have run a preliminary short experiment in an undergrad business 
class, asking the students to make decisions in two simultaneous trust games 
where player B selects one of four return levels. The possible return levels 
(denominated as fraction of X) were 0.45, 0.75, 1.35, 1.65 in one game, 
compared to 0.15, 0.45, 1.65, 1.95 in the other. The experimental method of 
the undergrads experiment was similar to the trust game method of the main 
experiment. Subjects were requested to make decisions as player A and B, 
assuming their partner would be randomly selected from a different class and 
the roles would be randomly assigned to derive the participation fees. The 
undergrad class' return distributions were then used to define the main 
experiment reversed-order lottery allocation tasks (see the first snapshot of 
Figure 3 for the 0.15-1.95 lottery). The instructions for the respective trust 
games emphasized that these games would be played with students from a 
distinct experiment whose return choices were collected in advance. The 
return distribution was presented as part of the trust game description, and 
the subjects submitted their trust decision but were not requested to select a 
return level (see the second snapshot of Figure 3).5 The extra games were 
presented at the last chapter of the booklet; together with two of the binary-
return games that were presented again to test for consistency (see Web 
supplement B).  
4. Notation and statistical method 
Table I introduces some notation to simplify the discussion of results. The 
abbreviations INV and LOT represent the trust game investments and the 
respective lottery allocations, with ∆=INV-LOT denoting the signed 
differences. The variables are presented in K units, so that investment of 
50,000 is shortened to 50. The variable R is used for the selected return level 
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 The reversed order tasks are similar to Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012), but we run the 
comparisons within subject. 
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(LRL or HRL), while %(HRL) is the proportion of subjects choosing high 
return. P(HRL) denotes the likelihood that subjects assign to high return, and 
E(R) is the expected return on investment as derived from P(HRL). Subscript 
6 is used to represent averages across the six conditions; e.g., LOT6 is the 
average investment in the 6 lotteries (the filler is always ignored). The 
subscript 4 is similarly used for the conditions with binary returns. σ(Z) is the 
standard deviation of Z, and ρ(Z1,Z2) is the Pearson correlation between Z1 
and Z2. Statistical tests are run on individual averages where applicable; e.g., 
to compare the LRL=0.15 and LRL=0.9 trust levels, we subtract the average 
INV at the two 0.15 games from the average INV at the two 0.9 games and 
apply the test to the paired differences. A sign-test is used for testing one-
sample hypotheses, while the Pitman permutation test is used for between-
sample comparisons. We always report 2-tails significance, using ***,**,* for 
p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1.  
Table I: Notation  
Symbol Description Scale / range  
INV The amount invested by the trustor  0-100  
LOT The amount allocated to the lottery 0-100  
∆=INV-LOT The paired difference INV minus LOT Between -100 and +100  
R The return selected by the trustee  LRL or HRL 
%(HRL) The proportion choosing HRL 0-100% percent 
P(HRL) The likelihood assigned to high return 0-100% percent 
E(R) The expected return on investment Between LRL and HRL 
 
5. Results 
5.1: Trust decisions in the binary-return games  
On average, the levels of trust in the current experiment are close to those 
observed in experiments with dynamic trust games, although belief in 
conditional reciprocity cannot motive trustors when decisions are 
simultaneous.6 The mean investment in the 4 binary-return games (INV4) was 
46 with standard deviation 22.6, and the hypothesis that subjects invest half of 
the endowments could not be rejected (p=0.28). Johnson and Mislin (2011) 
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  In dynamic setting, investment of large X may follow from the belief that X is essential for 
generous return. 
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meta-analysis of 167 trust decisions similarly revealed mean percentile 
investment of 50%.  
 
Table II: General results* 
*Columns (a)-(b) and (d)-(f) present the mean values of the variables. 
 
Column (a) of Table II however shows that levels of investment strongly 
differed between games. The mean investment in the games with low return 
level of 0.15 was 35 compared to mean investment of 57 in the LRL=0.9 
games, and only 20 participants showed stronger willingness to trust when 
LRL=0.15 (sign-test of the equality of investments at the 0.15 and 0.9 games; 
p<0.01). When the expected return on investment is derived from the 
likelihood that each subject assigns to high and low return, the average 
expected return is 1.19 for the games with LRL=0.9 compared to 0.76 for the 
games with LRL=0.15 (Column (b) of Table II). Sign-tests confirm that 
subjects expected significant losses in each of the 0.15 games, while 
expecting significant gains in the games with LRL=0.9 (p<0.01 in all 4 tests). 
The strong decrease in investments when LRL=0.15 therefore suits the shift in 
expectations.   
 
The impact of HRL on trust, however, was weaker. On average, the HRL=1.8 
investments were only 2K larger than the HRL=1.35 investments and 
repeated measures analysis confirmed that neither HRL nor the interaction 
between LRL and HRL affected investments (Web supplement C). The mean 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
Condition INV E(R) %(HRL) P(HRL) R LOT 
Testing 
INV=LOT 
0.9-1.35 57 1.11 47% 47% 1.11 59 N.S (p=0.53) 
0.15-1.35 33 0.71 48% 47% 0.73 33 N.S (p=0.29) 
0.15-1.8 37 0.81 42% 40% 0.84 29 p<0.02 
0.9-1.8 57 1.26 31% 40% 1.18 57 N.S (p=0.67) 
4 conditions 
average  
46 0.97 42% 44% 0.96 45 N.S (p=0.69) 
0.45-1.65 54 - - - 1.25 58 N.S (p=0.21) 
0.15-1.95 44 - - - 1.15 45 N.S (p=0.99) 
6 conditions 
average 
47 - - - 1.05 47 N.S (p=0.99) 
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expected return, however, increased from 0.71 to 0.81 (p=0.12) in the 
structural shift from 0.15-1.35 to 0.15-1.8, while increasing from 1.11 to 1.26 
(p<0.01) in the move from 0.9-1.35 to 0.9-1.8. The weak response to HRL 
illustrates that trust shows limited adaptivity to expectations. The restricted 
responsiveness would surface repeatedly at the next sections.  
5.2: Trustees decisions in the binary-return games 
We now turn to subjects' decisions at the trustee's role. Over all 4 games, LRL 
was selected more frequently than HRL (58% vs. 42%), but equality could not 
be rejected (N=52 subjects with %(HRL)<50%; N=35 with %(HRL)>50%; 
p=0.09). About 1/3 of the subjects (N=37) chose the low return level in all 4 
games, while only 1/6 (N=19) always chose the high return level. On average, 
the trustees returned 0.96 of the transfer which represents 0.32 of the tripled 
amount. The average return in the 137 experiments covered by Johnson and 
Mislin (2011) was 0.37. 
 
Column (c) of Table II compares the frequency of generous (HRL) return 
across games. Unsurprisingly, the high return is selected less frequently when 
HRL=1.8 compared to the games with HRL=1.35 (36% compared to 48%, 
p<0.01). Since the trustee pays back 60% of the tripled transfer when 
HRL=1.8, compared to 45% when HRL=1.35, the lower generosity at the 1.8 
games may represent aversion to disadvantageous split of the tripled transfer. 
Aversion to advantageous, but strongly unequal, split shows in the increase in 
generosity from 31% to 42% (p=0.04) when LRL decreases from 0.9 to 0.15 
and HRL is fixed at 1.8. Since the trustee brings a loss of 85% to the trustor 
when choosing LRL=0.15, compared to loss of only 10% when LRL=0.9, a 
similar adjustment could be anticipated for the games with HRL=1.35. The 
increase in %(HRL) in 0.15-1.35 compared to 0.9-1.35 however was only 1% 
and statistically insignificant.7  
 
To understand the return patterns more closely we run cluster analysis on the 
4 binary return decisions. Table III shows the bottom line results for 5 clusters 
(R2=0.74), dividing the pool of 110 participants into 4 main clusters C1-C4 
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 Table III suggests that the difference largely follows from cluster 3. 
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with at least 14 subjects in each, and a small cluster of only 7 (C5). Cluster C1 
is the largest counting 50 participants. The subjects in this group can be 
classified as egocentric or lacking other-regarding concerns as they almost 
always choose the LRL. In particular, this group includes the 37 subjects that 
chose the low return level in all 4 games. Cluster C2 (N=24) contrarily 
contains the altruistic or strongly other-regarding types that chose the HRL 
constantly. Clusters C3 and C4 are smaller, counting 15 and 14 participants. 
The subjects in C3 show signs of egalitarian preferences, as they always 
choose the close to equal (45% to A, 55% to B) split of the tripled transfer 
when such split is possible. The 14 subjects in C4 alternatively show 
preference for almost-fair reciprocation, as they always choose the 0.9 return 
where possible. Finally, the few subjects in C5 (N=7) are 100% generous 
when LRL=0.9, but grab almost all of the tripled investment when it is possible 
to pay back only 5% (LRL=0.15).  
 
Table III: Cluster analysis of returns*  
Clusters 
C1 
N=50 
C2 
N=24 
C3 
N=15 
C4 
N=14 
C5 
N=7 
Sample 
N=110 
%(HRL)       
0.9-1.35 18% 88% 100% 0% 100% 47% 
0.15-1.35 0% 100% 100% 100% 0% 48% 
0.15-1.8 8% 92% 53% 64% 43% 42% 
0.9-1.8 6% 100% 0% 0% 100% 31% 
σ6(INV) 21.9 17.9 22.7 16.9 33.2 21.2 
σ6(LOT) 28.9 24.6 26.5 18.3 33.4 26.6 
ρ6(LOT,∆) -0.68 -0.62 -0.57 -0.58 -0.30 -0.61 
*The upper panel presents the frequency of generous return in each game, for each cluster. 
The lower panel is discussed in Section 5.7. The subscript 6 is used for subject-level 
statistics; e.g., ρ6(LOT,∆) is the subject-level correlation between LOT and ∆, building on 6 
observations. The table presents the mean subject level statistics for the N=110 participants.  
 
 
5.3: Comparing INV and LOT  
Column (f) of Table II presents the mean lottery allocation in each condition, 
while column (g) shows the results of testing the equality INV=LOT. First 
glance at the statistics does not reveal consistent differences between the 
paired investments. The mean INV and LOT are almost equal in 3 conditions. 
The lottery allocations are smaller at 0.15-1.8 (p<0.02), but the differences 
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diminish when the most pessimistic subjects are ignored (mean INV 39 vs. 
mean LOT 35 for the 92 subjects with E(R)>0.25; p=0.24). The correlations 
between INV and LOT are positive, but far from perfect, ranging between 0.11 
and 0.39 (Table IV).  
 
 Table IV: Comovement of INV and LOT * 
* "Meff E(R) on Y" represents the marginal effect of E(R) on Y as explained in the text. The “4 
(6) conditions” results build on the average investments or returns; e.g., the 0.33 at the left 
column represents the correlation ρ(LOT4,INV4).  
 
Closer look at the joint distributions however shows that INV exhibits a 
regressive pattern relatively to LOT, as subjects trust more than they risk 
when their lottery allocations are relatively small, while trusting less than 
risking when their lottery allocations are larger. At 0.9-1.35, for example, the 
correlation between INV and LOT is 0.25 (p<0.01), but a median split reveals 
that the subjects with smaller lottery allocations invested almost 70% more in 
the trust game (mean LOT 29 compared to mean INV 49; N=55; p<0.01), 
while the subjects with larger lottery allocations invested about 30% less in 
the trust game (mean LOT 89 compared to mean INV 65; N=55; p<0.01). The 
correlation between LOT and ∆=INV-LOT is accordingly negative -0.69 
(p<0.01) and the standard deviation of INV is 29 compared to standard 
deviation of 35 for LOT (p<0.03 by Pitman-Morgan test for the equality of 
dependent variances). Table IV shows that similar patterns emerge in all other 
conditions. The correlations between LOT and ∆ are negative -0.6 to -0.7 
although INV and LOT positively correlate, and the standard deviation of the 
trust game investments is always smaller than the standard deviation of the 
Condition ρ(LOT,INV) ρ(LOT,∆) σ(INV) σ(LOT) 
Meff 
E(R) 
on INV 
Meff 
E(R) 
on LOT 
0.9-1.35 0.25 -0.69 29 35 0.66 1.93 
0.15-1.35 0.30 -0.73 27 35 0.17 0.54 
0.15-1.80 0.39 -0.63 30 34 0.09 0.38 
0.9-1.80 0.11 -0.74 31 36 0.19 0.86 
4 conditions  0.33 -0.67 23 27 0.24  0.67  
0.45-1.65 0.46 -0.56 27 29 - - 
0.15-1.95 0.51 -0.57 24 27 - - 
6 conditions  0.44 -0.61 20 22 - - 
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respective lottery allocations (see Figure 4(a) for scatterplot of the 0.15-1.35 
data). The 2 columns at the right of the table relatedly show that LOT shows 
stronger responsiveness to expected returns compared to INV. To measure 
responsiveness, we run Tobit regressions of INV or LOT on the subjective 
E(R), taking into account the possible censoring at 0 and 100, and use the 
results to estimate the marginal effect of E(R) on investments. The table 
shows that LOT responsiveness to expected returns is 3-4 times larger in all 4 
conditions.8 The lottery allocation decisions therefore appear more calculated 
and volatile compared to the relatively stable trust game investments.  
5.4: The price of trust in terms of reduced expected profitability 
Intuitively, we suspect that the smaller responsiveness of trust to expected 
returns may be costly, since subjects trust too much when the expected return 
is unattractive while trusting too little when the return prospects are appealing. 
To check this intuition we calculate the expected payoff on each trust decision 
using the direct formula (100-INV)+INV·E(R), and use the 4 games average 
as measure of the “expected payoff on trust”. The expected payoffs on the 
respective lottery allocations is similarly derived using (100-LOT)+LOT·E(R), 
and the 4 conditions average is used again to measure the “expected payoff 
on risk-taking”. The (mean) expected payoff on trust, by these calculations, is 
102.6, compared to expected payoff of 108.2 on risk-taking. Paired 
comparisons reveal that 88 subjects expect larger return on risk-taking, while 
only 17 subjects exhibit the reversed ranking (p<0.01). By way of 
interpretation, the comparison suggests that subjects sacrifice 5.2% of the 
return that they expect to collect in the pure-risk assignments, when the tasks 
are framed as trust games. The smaller adaptivity of trust is expensive, at 
least in terms of expected payoffs.9 
 
                                                           
8
 The marginal effect is separately calculated for each subject and the table presents the 
mean effects for the 110 participants. The stronger responsiveness of LOT to E(R) also 
shows when the standard deviation of the subjective return is included as additional 
explanatory variable. 
9
 See Web supplement D for more details. Note also that when the trust game payoffs are 
calculated assuming the mean return rates of Table II (e.g., the payoffs at 0.9-1.35 are (100-
INV)+INV·1.11), the trust game payoffs fall further to 100.4. The additional decrease mostly 
follows from 0.9-1.8 where expectations were too optimistic. The comparison of this figure to 
the 108.2, however, is problematic in terms of interpretation. 
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5.5: Results for the games with four return levels  
Recall that the lotteries with four return levels were presented before the 
respective trust games and the distribution of returns was provided as part of 
the game description, decreasing the distance between the paired tasks 
(Figure 3). The lower panel of Table IV, however, shows that trust is still less 
volatile than risk-taking and the correlation between LOT and ∆=INV-LOT 
stays negative, close to -0.6. When the sample is median split by LOT, the 
subjects with larger lottery allocations show smaller trust (mean INV 61 
compared to mean LOT 71; N=54; INV=LOT rejected at p<0.01), while the 
subjects with smaller lottery allocations show the reversed ranking (mean INV 
37 compared to mean LOT 30; N=47; p=0.02). Figure 4(b) depicts the results 
for 0.15-1.95.10  
5.6: Individual-level analysis   
When the standard deviation of the 6 trust game investments and the 6 lottery 
allocations is separately calculated for each subject (using subscripts 6 again 
for the six conditions statistics), the mean         is 21.2 compared to mean 
        of 26.6. Paired comparisons reveal                 for 76 
subjects, while the ranking is reversed for only 31, confirming that INV shows 
lower volatility at the individual level (p<0.01). The regressive pattern of INV 
relatively to LOT also manifests at the individual level, in spite of the small 
samples of 6 observations. The correlation between LOT and INV is positive 
for 71 subjects, averaging at 0.26 (N=110; p<0.01), while the correlation 
         is negative for 98 subjects, averaging at -0.61 (p<0.01). Subject-
level regressions (similar to the sample Tobit regressions of Section 5.3) 
reveal almost 2.5 stronger effect of E(R) on the individual lottery allocations. 
The mean marginal effect of E(R) on INV is 0.27 compared to mean marginal 
effect of 0.61 on LOT. N=82 subjects show larger responsiveness to expected 
return in the lottery allocations, while only 25 show the opposite ranking 
(p<0.01). 
 
 
                                                           
10
 Non-surprisingly the results are somewhat weaker for these games. The equality of 
variances could not be rejected: p=0.11 for 0.15-1.95; p=0.26 for 0.45-1.95.  
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5.7: Other-regarding preferences 
The lower volatility of trust could follow from altruistic preferences of the 
trustor. To illustrate the intuition note that trustors with other-regarding 
preferences would recognize that the trustee is expected to gain 3-E(R) when 
their expected return is E(R). Assuming linearity for simplicity, let         
                represent an investment model where the trustor 
responds to expected returns, but also takes into account the residual return 
to the trustee. Assuming     since self-regard is stronger than altruism, the 
effective slope of INV with respect to      is      . If the lottery allocation 
decisions take the simpler form                then trust responsiveness 
to expected returns would appear smaller because of the moderating effect of 
altruistic concerns.11  
 
Recall however that almost 1/2 of the sample (N=50) chose the low return 
level in almost all binary-return games (cluster C1 of Table III). It is 
reasonable to assume that such subjects are close to egocentric or have 
negligible other-regarding preferences. If the smaller responsiveness of INV to 
expected return follows from altruistic concerns, the difference should 
diminish and even disappear for this group of egocentric participants. The 
statistics at the bottom of Table III however strongly contradict this prediction. 
The mean σ6(INV) of these subjects is around 29 compared to mean σ6(LOT) 
of 22 and the individual-level regressions suggest that the mean 
responsiveness of LOT to E(R) is more than twice larger than the mean 
responsiveness of INV to E(R) in this subsample (mean marginal effects: 0.62 
compared to 0.27; p<0.01). Trust is therefore significantly less volatile than 
parallel lottery allocation even for the 50 subjects that show strong selfishness 
at the trustee role. The bottom lines of Table III additionally illustrate that the 
lower volatility of trust shows for each of 4 main clusters of trustees.  
                                                           
11
 When designing the questionnaire we considered a quadruple design where subjects also 
decide on the amount they allocate to risky lotteries that pay R to the decision maker and 3-R 
to a passive counterpart (similarly to the risky dictator games of Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 
2004). Such quadruple design would have considerably increase the length of the 
questionnaire and strengthen the risk that subjects respond to the link between tasks. 
Preceding trust game studies moreover show that choices in risky dictator games do not differ 
systematically from choices in pure-risk tasks (Bohnet et al., 2008).  
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6. Gender and risk preference  
To characterize individual risk preference outside the paired INV-LOT 
decisions, we use the gain-domain risk preference test of Weinstock and 
Sonsino (2014) as presented in Table V. 
 
Table V: The risk preference task 
Problem Risky lottery Safe lottery Risk 
premium 
%(safe) 
sample 
%(safe) 
males 
%(safe) 
Females 
GAINS1 1000 or 200 700 or 600 -50 86% 82% 92% 
GAINS2 900 or 100 550 or 450 0 77% 73% 83% 
GAINS3 900 or 0 400 or 350 +75 79% 69% 92% 
GAINS4 1000 or 250 550 or 400 +150 41% 34% 50% 
GAINS5 1000 or 100 300 or 200 +300 17% 11% 25% 
* Risk premium is the difference between the expected payoff on the risky lottery and the 
expected payoff on the safe lottery; %(safe) is the proportion of subjects choosing the safe 
lottery.   
 
The task consists of 5 binary choices between risky and safe 50-50 lotteries, 
where the premium for taking risk increases with the index number of the 
problem. The right columns of the table disclose the proportion of risk averse 
choices in the MBA sample, showing that risk-taking generally increase with 
the index and the males show smaller risk aversion compared to females 
(54% risk-averse choices for males compared to 68% for females; p<0.01).12 
The next paragraphs summarize the gender differences in trust and pure risk-
taking in 5 short observations, using Tables VI-VIII to support the discussions. 
RAG is used for the proportion of risk-averse choices at GAINS2-GAINS5 
(including GAINS1 slightly weakens the correlations).  
 
Observation 1: The trust game investments of males and females are similar, 
but males strongly respond to subjective expected returns while females' trust 
is relatively stable. 
                                                           
12
 The Weinstock and Sonsino (2014) task also includes 5 loss-domain choice problems. As 
in Croson and Gneezy (2009), the gender differences weaken in loss-domain (61% risk 
averse choices for males; 67% for females; p=0.28). The loss-domain risk preference 
measures did not interact with the triadic design variables of interest. 
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At first glance, the trust games investments of males and females appear 
similar. The mean INV6 is about 47 for both genders (Table VI), and equality 
could not be rejected for any of the six games. The females were slightly more 
pessimistic regarding trustworthiness (mean average expected return 0.94, 
compared to 1.0 for the males; p=0.25), but again equality could not be 
rejected for any of the games. The left panel of Table VII however illustrates 
that males’ investments strongly respond to subjective expected returns, while 
females’ investments detach from expectations. The correlations between INV 
and E(R) are always positive, larger than 0.2, for males, but mixed in sign and 
clearly insignificant for females. The discrepancy also shows in game-specific 
Tobit regressions that control for RAG (the left panel of Table VIII). The E(R) 
coefficients are statistically significant at p<0.05 in 3 of 4 games, and 
marginally significant at p=0.1 in the remaining case, for the males. The 
coefficients are never significant for the females. Finally, the difference 
reflects in larger volatility of males' investments: The mean σ6(INV) is 24 for 
males compared to 18 for females and  equality is easily rejected at p<0.01.
13 
The trust game investments of males, in conclusion, appear more calculated 
and expectations-based compared to the relatively stable investments of the 
females.  
Table VI: Gender comparison 
 Males (N=62) Females (N=48)  Significance 
INV6      47 47 N.S (p=0.99) 
E(R)4     1.0 0.94 N.S (p=0.25) 
R4           0.98 0.95 N.S (p=0.69) 
σ6(INV)  24 18 p<0.01 
LOT6 51 42 p=0.02 
∆6=INV6-LOT6 -4 5 p=0.02 
σ6(LOT)  29 24 p=0.05 
*The shading highlights significant differences  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
13
 Closer look shows that the stronger volatility of males’ investments does not follow from 
more volatile expectations. 
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Table VII: Pearson correlations between INV (LOT) and expected returns 
 Trust decisions Lottery allocations 
 Males Females Males Females 
0.9-1.35 0.27**  0.09 0.64*** 0.47*** 
0.15-1.35 0.39*** -0.15 0.68*** 0.49*** 
0.15-1.8 0.23*  0.04 0.72*** 0.55*** 
0.9-1.8 0.20 -0.02 0.60*** 0.52*** 
Avg level 0.37*** 0.00 0.68*** 0.55*** 
 
 
Table VIII: Responsiveness of  INV and LOT to E(R) and RAG  
 Trust game investments (INV) Lottery allocations (LOT) 
 E(R) RAG E(R) RAG 
 Males Females  Males  Females  Males Females  Males  Females  
0.9-
1.35 
0.89** 0.24 -11.4 -8.6 2.1*** 1.44*** -11.6 -21.7 
0.15-
1.35 
0.32*** -0.06 -24.9** 11.1 0.61*** 0.36*** -5.2 -13.8 
0.15-
1.8 
0.15** 0.03 -26.2** 0.01 0.41*** 0.29*** -10.5 5.8 
0.9-
1.8 
0.28* -0.02 -15.5 -3.8 0.88*** 0.76*** -15.7 -14.6 
0.45-
1.65 
- - -37.3*** -15.2 - - -34.3*** -3.5 
0.15-
1.95 
- - -26.3*** -13.5 - - -33.0*** -16.4 
* The table summarizes the results of regressing INV (left panel) or LOT (right panel) on E(R) 
and RAG. The Tobit regressions were separately run for males (N=62) and females (N=48), 
and the table presents the mean marginal effects by each estimation. The shading is used to 
highlight cases where a Wald test rejected the equality of coefficients for males and females 
at p<0.05. Note that since the estimated E(R) and RAG effects on females' INV are very noisy, 
the Wald test sometimes could not reject equality although the effects are significant for 
males but insignificant for females 
 
Observation 2: RAG negatively correlates with males' trust, but does not 
interact with females’ trust. The risk-seeking males accordingly show the 
highest levels of trust.  
Analysis of the correlation between RAG and trust again reveals a 
fundamental difference between the results for males and females. The 
disparity clearly shows at the average 6-game level. The correlation between 
RAG and INV6 is negative -0.33 for males (p<0.01), compared to insignificant -
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0.07 (p=0.62) for females. The mean investment of the N=41 risk-seeking 
males (RAG≤0.5) is about 51 compared to 39 for the N=21 relatively risk-
averse (p<0.05). The respective figures for females are 48 and 46 (p=0.8). 
The significant correlations for males, but not for females, also show at the 
Tobit regressions of Table VIII. The RAG coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant in 4 of 6 cases for males. The effects are mixed in sign 
and insignificant in the regressions for females.14 The usefulness of 
experimental risk preference tasks where subjects select between stylized 
lotteries has been debated in Dohmen et al., (2011), Lönnqvist et al., (2015) 
and others. The results here suggest that controlling for gender is essential in 
such discussions.  
 
Observation 3: Males' lottery allocations exceed those of females (beyond 
RAG), especially in the conditions where the lotteries are relatively attractive.  
The smaller risk aversion of males shows again in the lottery allocation 
assignments. The mean LOT6 of males is 51 compared to 42 for females 
(p=0.02) and the allocations of males exceed those of females in all 6 
conditions. Web supplement E moreover illustrates that the males show larger 
lottery investments even when RAG is controlled. The mean LOT6 of the N=18 
males with RAG=0.5 is 56 compared to 46 for the N=17 females with the same 
RAG (p<0.05). The respective figures for the 16 males and 14 females with 
RAG=0.75 are 52 and 35 (p=0.06). It is interesting however to note that the 
difference mainly follows from larger investments of males in relatively 
attractive lotteries. When the expected return on investment is divided by the 
standard deviation to obtain the Sharpe ratio, the average ratios exceed 3.3 in 
3 cases (0.9-1.35, 0.9-1.8, 0.45-1.65), but fall below 1.7 in the other 3 
conditions (0.15-1.35, 0.15-1.8, 0.15-1.95). The equality of males and females 
LOT is rejected for each of the relatively attractive lotteries, but cannot be 
rejected for each of the less attractive lotteries.15  
                                                           
14
 RAG did not interact with E(R) for males or females. Web supplement E contrasts the INV, 
LOT and E(R) of males and females in each game, controlling for RAG. Web supplement F 
shows the RAG correlations with INV, LOT and other key variables for males and females. 
15
 The mean investment of males in the 3 attractive lotteries is 64 compared to 51 for females 
(p<0.01). The statistics for the 3 unattractive lotteries are 39 and 32 (p=0.19).  
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Observation 4: Female’s responsiveness to expected return, which was 
close to zero in the trust games, turns significant in the lottery tasks, but 
males’ responsiveness is stronger.  
The right panel of Table VII shows that females' investments, that did not 
respond to expected returns in the trust games, significantly correlate with 
expected returns in each of the 4 lottery allocation tasks. At 0.9-1.35, for 
example, the correlation between females’ LOT and E(R) is 0.47 (p<0.01), 
compared to 0.09 (p=0.53) correlation between INV and E(R). The respective 
correlations for males are 0.64 (p<0.01) and 0.27 (p=0.04), suggesting that 
the males, similarly to the females, are more attentive to expected returns in 
the lottery tasks. The right panel of Table VIII however proves that males' LOT 
responsiveness to expected returns is stronger, as the equality of the E(R) 
coefficients is rejected in all 4 estimations (Wald tests; p=0.04 for 0.9-1.8; 
p<0.01 for the three other games). The difference in responsiveness finally 
reflects in higher volatility of the males’ lottery allocations across the 6 
conditions: the mean σ6(LOT) is 29 for males compared to 24 for females 
(p<0.05).  
 
Observation 5: The risk-seeking males exhibit the strongest LOT volatility. 
The stronger predictive power of RAG for males, compared to females, 
emerges again when the volatility of the 6 lottery allocations is examined. The 
correlation between RAG and σ6(LOT) is -0.27 (p=0.03) for males, compared 
to insignificant -0.15 (p=0.32) for females. The average σ6(LOT) of the 
relatively risk-seeking males is 31 compared to 24 for the risk-averse 
(p<0.05). The respective figures for females are 25 and 23 (p=0.40).  
 
7. Is trust a special case of decision under uncertainty?  
Choice theory draws a distinction between conditions of uncertainty or 
ambiguity where the probabilities of events are unknown, and cases of risk 
where the probabilities are exogenously provided (Knight, 1921). From this 
perspective, trust falls closer to decision under uncertainty, since trustors 
decide on the transfer without knowing the chances for high or low return, 
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while our lottery allocation tasks match the paradigm of decision under risk, 
since the probability distribution of returns is provided. Corcos et al. (2012) 
indeed show that when the Holt and Laury (2002) risk attitude test is modified 
to measure ambiguity aversion, the adapted measure significantly correlates 
with trust, while the original HL measure does not exhibit such correlation. In 
Houser et al. (2010) moreover the HL usual risk-aversion measure correlates 
with investments in pure-risk type of scenarios, but the correlation dissipates 
for similarly structured trust decisions. These findings bring up the question 
whether the differences between the parallel trust and pure-risk decisions of 
the current experiment match the results of comparative studies of decision 
under uncertainty versus decision under risk. We discuss three aspects of the 
current results that conform or depart from findings of the decision under 
ambiguity literature: 16 
 
(a) The lower volatility of trust compared to the respective lottery allocations 
intuitively relates to the stronger “likelihood insensitivity” in decision under 
uncertainty compared to decision under risk (Wakker, 2010). Likelihood 
insensitive decision-makers slowly respond to changes in given or perceived 
likelihoods of events. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) probability weighting 
function17, for instance, implies that an increase from 30% to 40% in the 
probability of winning a prize, increases the subjective decision-weight by 5%. 
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) show that likelihood insensitivity under uncertainty 
exceeds likelihood insensitivity under risk, concluding that decisions-makers 
are less sensitive to changes in (perceived) probabilities in domains of 
uncertainty. In the current application, the difference may reflect in lower 
responsiveness of trust to the likelihood assessments and explain its lower 
volatility compared to the lottery allocations.   
 
(b) The literature on probability weighting (under risk) repeatedly shows that 
females exhibit stronger likelihood insensitivity compared to males (Fehr-
                                                           
16
 In general it is impossible to predict if uncertainty would increase or decrease risk-taking 
relatively to similar pure risk scenarios (see Gollier 2011 for theoretical discussion; Charness 
and Gneezy, 2010 for experimental evidence), so ambiguity aversion cannot be invoked to 
claim that LOT should exceed INV or vice versa. 
17
 w(p)=p
γ
/[ p
γ
+(1-p)
 γ
]
 1/γ
 with γ estimated at 0.61 
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Duda et al., 2006; Charupat et al., 2013). This nicely fits the lower volatility of 
females' lottery allocations compared to males' lottery allocations (Table VI). If 
the stronger likelihood insensitivity of females extends to the weighting of 
uncertain events, then likelihood-insensitivity may also explain the weaker 
volatility of females' trust investments (but we could not find studies that point 
at gender differences in likelihood sensitivity under uncertainty).  
 
(c) Some finance field studies (e.g., Yilmazer and Lyons, 2010; Speelman et 
al., 2013) and experiments (e.g., Borghans et al., 2009) suggest that females 
take less risk than males under uncertainty, similarly to their stronger risk 
aversion when chances are known (Charness and Gneezy, 2012). In our 
sample, however, the trust of females did not differ consistently from the trust 
of males, although the females' lottery allocations were significantly smaller. 
Again, we attribute the discrepancy to the idiosyncrasy of trust for females. 
Females' trust levels are large, relatively to their smaller lottery allocations, 
and very weakly respond to changes in perceived trustworthiness.  
 
8. The disappearance of betrayal aversion 
The literature on betrayal aversion (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; 2008) 
suggests that decision-makers willingness to trust a human counterpart lags 
behind their willingness to engage in similarly-structured risky gambles. In the 
simplified trust game of Figure 5, player A chooses between ending the game 
with payoffs (10,10) or passing to B who makes binary choice between 
(15,15) and (8,22). Subjects at player A's role are asked to state how large 
probability of being paired with B that selects the (15,15), they demand for 
passing the game. The experiment is incentivized so that stating the true 
Minimal Acceptance Probability (MAP) is a dominant strategy. The average 
MAP in the 2004 paper was 0.54, indicating that subjects demand a premium 
of about 17.8% (the difference between 0.54*15+0.46*8 and 10) to take the 
risk of trusting player B. The premium, however, significantly reduced when 
subjects played a similarly structured pure-risk game, as illustrated at the 
bottom of Figure 5. The threshold MAP probability of receiving the 15 payoff, 
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demanded for taking the lottery risk was only 0.37, indicating that subjects are 
willing to take risk for much modest premium of 5.9%.  
 
While betrayal aversion remerged in diverse follow-up studies (see Aimone et 
al., 2014 for recent discussion), the results of Fetchenhauer and Dunning 
(2012) and the current study suggest that willingness to trust may be similar 
and even exceed risk-taking when the return distribution is controlled. We 
propose 3 plausible explanations to the disappearance of betrayal aversion in 
the current experiment:  
 
(a) Procedural variation: Betrayal aversion mostly emerged in experiments 
using the MAP procedure. The current experiment contrarily elicited the 
willingness to invest in nominal 0-100K currency amounts. The difference in 
results may thus be classified as a case of procedural variation (Tversky and 
Thaler, 1990). When MAP is used to determine the willingness to take risk, in 
particular, subjects may instinctively begin by calculating the break-even 
probability for taking risk (p'=2/7 in Figure 5), and adjust from this self-
generated anchor (Epley and Gilovich, 2001) to arrive at their MAP. When 
MAPs are elicited for the trust games, however, the break-even anchor 
becomes less relevant and fear of betrayal can induce an emotional effect 
(Inbar and Gilovich, 2011) that increases the gap between the benchmark and 
the reported MAPs. Strack and Mussweiler (1997) illustrate that numeric 
anchors are assimilated when the anchor is sufficiently similar to the target, 
but a contrast effect may emerge when the anchor is different. The 2/7 
threshold probability could, in this spirit, be assimilated into the reported MAP 
in the pure-risk condition, while the contrast pushed MAP away in the trust 
games. The investment choice procedure of the current experiment did not 
open space for such differences.  
 
(b) The within-subject design of the current questionnaire: In the MAP 
experiments, the trust and pure-risk games were played in the laboratory by 
separate groups of subjects. The current questionnaire oppositely compared 
six trust and pure risk decisions within-subject, using random task selection 
for incentivization. To decrease the distance between the experiments and 
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test the robustness of the current results, it would be interesting to implement 
the triadic design in a laboratory, using procedures that get closer to standard 
trust game experiments, while increasing the stakes. Subjects would clearly 
recognize the link between the single trust game and the later lottery 
allocation task in such design, but if one of the 3 tasks is randomly selected 
for payouts, the procedures are clear, and stakes are substantial, the trust 
game decisions and lottery allocations may systematically differ.  
 
(c) Cultural differences: Bohnet et al. (2008) find large between-country 
differences in betrayal aversion (MAP of 0.17 for the U.S. compared to 0.03-
0.04 for Switzerland and Brazil). It is possible that Israeli MBAs would not 
show betrayal aversion even in MAP experiments.  
 
9. Concluding discussion  
Berg et al. (1995) already propose that trust is a primitive predisposition of 
human decision (see also Ortmann et al., 2000). Indeed the literature that has 
evolved around the trust game shows that genetic variation plays important 
role in personal trust (Cesarini et al., 2008), and neuroeconomic studies point 
at physiological differences between trust and pure risk-taking (McCabe et al., 
2001; Kosfeld et al., 2005; Krueger et al., 2012). The results of the current 
study complement the trust-as-trait literature illustrating that trust still 
responds to the microstructure of the environment, but its adaptivity is much 
smaller than parallel pure risk-taking. The trust of males strongly responds to 
expected returns while females' trust is relative stable, and an exogenous 
measure of personal inclination to take lottery-risk shows predictive power for 
males', but not for females', decisions along the experiment. By way of 
interpretation, trust is closer to a stable trait for females, while appearing more 
circumstances-dependent for males. The results additionally propose that 
controlling for gender is essential in testing the predictive power of exogenous 
risk attitude tools for context-specific decisions. Since the typical findings of 
the betrayal aversion literature do not replicate, additional experimental work 
is required to determine the scope of betrayal aversion in trust.  
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Figure 1: Snapshots of the translated assignments  
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Figure 2:  
The flow of tasks in the binary-games and reversed-order games 
 
   Binary Games          Binary Games 
TRUST DECISION               BELIEF ELICITATION                LOTTERY ALLOCATION 
             4 return-levels games (exogenous return distributions) 
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Figure 3: The reverse-order tasks (0.15-1.95) 
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Figure 4: The comovement of INV, LOT and ∆  
4 (a): 0.15-1.35 
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4 (b): 0.15-1.95 
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Figure 5: The Betrayal Aversion games  
 
 
 
 
